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BACKGROUND
The results of Britain's referendum on EU membership on 23 June 2016 were:
Since Scotland voted by 62% to remain in the EU, while the United Kingdom (UK) voted by 52% to leave, the
question of Scottish independence is on the table again. The Scottish government says that Scotland should not be
taken out of the EU against the will of its people, and that a second referendum on independence is "highly likely".
In a referendum in September 2014 the Scottish people voted against independence. Opinion polls currently
suggest that a majority in Scotland wants another referendum, and would vote for independence. 
How does the Scottish question relate to the UK's withdrawal from the EU? What factors have changed since the
Scottish people voted against independence in 2014? What are Scotland's chances of remaining in the EU?
STATE OF PLAY
Scotland's First Minister Nicola Sturgeon, leader of the Scottish National Party (SNP), handled the EU referendum
with distinction: she campaigned for the UK to remain in the EU and delivered a large majority in favour of it.
Britain's Prime Minister David Cameron, who launched and lost the referendum, resigned, and his Conservative
Party has chosen a new leader. The leader of the opposition Labour Party, Jeremy Corbyn, is under challenge.
British politics is in confusion, and uncertainty is amplified by the fact that in the referendum the Leave campaign
presented no coherent plan for managing the UK's withdrawal from the EU. Some political voices are now
suggesting another referendum on the EU, or parliamentary elections, to determine the way ahead. 
In this chaos, Sturgeon has appeared to be the only leader with a plan: she announced immediately that another
referendum on Scottish independence would be prepared as an 'option', and in meetings with the Presidents of
the European Parliament and the European Commission she underlined Scotland's wish to stay in the EU. But
Sturgeon is characteristically prudent. Before the referendum she urged Cameron to accept that withdrawal from
the EU should be conditional on the consent of the four countries of the UK: he refused (which perhaps he now
regrets). She maintains that her government's priority is to keep Scotland in the EU, that all options are on the
table, and that independence is not the starting-point. She is not yet committed to another referendum; she knows
that it would be unwise to launch one without being confident of the result.
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Population Leave Remain
United Kingdom 65.1 m. 52% 48%
England 54.7 m. 53% 46%
Scotland 5.4 m. 38% 62%
Wales 3.1 m. 52% 48%
Northern Ireland 1.9 m. 44% 56%
 
Britain's withdrawal from the EU 
With multiple uncertainties surrounding the timetable and results of Britain's negotiation for withdrawal from the
EU, the Scottish government has every reason to be cautious. If the British government makes a notification under
Article 50 at the end of this year, as some Conservatives suggest, then probably the United Kingdom would leave
the EU on 1 January 2019. But the future is uncertain: if there is another British referendum, or a change of
government in London, the situation could change.
In withdrawal negotiations, which are intergovernmental in character, the British government will represent the
UK. Scotland will not have a separate voice. That is why EU governments say that only London is competent to
conduct the negotiations, and why Sturgeon was not received by Donald Tusk, President of the European Council.
Prudently, most European leaders wish to avoid interfering in the UK's internal constitutional affairs by taking a
public position on Scottish independence.
Cameron has said that "withdrawal negotiations need to involve the full engagement of the Scottish, Welsh and
Northern Ireland governments to ensure that the interests of all parts of the UK are protected and advanced". What
this means in practice remains to be seen. In any case, London will not wish withdrawal negotiations to provide
for the possibility of an independent Scotland remaining in the EU, unless and until Scotland chooses
independence.
The terms negotiated for British withdrawal will be an important factor. If the UK obtains good access to the Single
Market and to other EU policies of interest to Scottish people that could be sufficiently attractive for Scotland to
remain in the UK. Although Sturgeon is working to ensure broad support in Scotland for her position, there are
some who would prefer to leave the EU: the fishing industry, for example, wants to escape from the Common
Fisheries Policy.
Changes since Scotland's last independence referendum
What factors have changed since September 2014, when Scotland voted against independence? How could they
affect a future independence referendum?
• The SNP has enjoyed a surge in public support. Its membership has more than doubled. In 2015 it gained 56 
seats in the Westminster parliament, where it is now the second largest opposition party. In 2016 its seats in the
Edinburgh parliament decreased from 69 to 63, but it remains in power with a minority government.
• The EU referendum has had a powerful effect on public opinion in Scotland. Many who voted against 
independence in 2014 say they would now vote for it, in order to remain in the EU. The atmosphere of 
xenophobia, distrust and deceit in which the referendum was conducted has increased Scottish dissatisfaction 
with British politics and 'English nationalism'.
• Scotland's economy has not flourished. Growth has been lower, and unemployment higher, than in the rest of 
the UK. Although Scotland has offshore energy resources, the price of oil has fallen. Uncertainty about future 
economic prospects was a key factor in the 'no' vote in 2014.
• Although Scotland's economy has become more integrated with the EU, its exports to the rest of the UK are four
times more in value than its exports to other EU members. The possibility that future trade between Scotland (in
the EU) and the rest of the UK (outside the EU) may face barriers is a new factor in the economics of 
independence.
• However, in the EU referendum a majority in England and Wales ignored economic warnings and voted for self-
government. The Scottish people may do the same.
Scotland's chances of remaining in the EU
From the point of view of the EU, Scotland is well qualified for membership. It has applied EU rules and polices
for more than 40 years; it is a prosperous and stable democracy, with a population of 5.4 million and an economy
twelfth in size within the EU; its situation would be similar to that of member states of comparable size such as
Ireland or Finland. Membership of the EU was a central element in the Scottish government's prospectus for
independence in the 2014 referendum. It is worth recalling that, of the thirteen states that joined the EU since
2004, seven had recently obtained or regained independence.
Scotland has many historic links with the continent. Attitudes to social policy are similar to those in Nordic
countries, and there is widespread dislike of policies pursued by Conservative governments in London. Public
opinion has been more favourable to the EU than in England, and the Scottish government's attitude to most
 
European policies, including free movement of workers, has been positive. After the EU referendum, Nicola
Sturgeon was the first political leader to request reassurances from the British government for the future of EU
citizens living in the UK.
What elements have changed since the 2014 referendum, when Scotland's accession to the EU was already under
discussion? At that time, most EU members disliked the idea of Scottish independence, which would have
weakened the UK. Now, as a result of its vote to leave the EU, the UK has lost goodwill, and weakened its
international position, while Scotland has won sympathy by its vote to remain. Nevertheless, some European states,
concerned by the rise of separatism, may be reluctant to see the UK weakened further by Scottish independence.
In 2014 some commentators argued that an independent Scotland must leave the EU, apply for accession under
Article 49, and join the queue of candidates. Others argued that a 'fast-track' accession could be made under
Article 48. José Manuel Barroso, then President of the European Commission, claimed that it would be “extremely
difficult, if not impossible” for Scotland to join the EU. How does that claim look now?
Visibly different. Within a few days of the EU referendum, Scottish MEP Alyn Smith got a standing ovation in the
European Parliament, and First Minister Nicola Sturgeon had meetings with Presidents Martin Schulz and Jean-
Claude Juncker. Most European governments are now well-disposed to Scotland as a result of its vote to remain in
the EU. But friendly faces can mask hard realities. For Scotland to stay in the EU, all member states must agree.
Would they? 
The main obstacle is the political interest of Spain. Madrid considers that Catalonia's demand for an
independence referendum is contrary to the Spanish constitution, and wishes to avoid any encouragement for
Barcelona. Other member states such as Belgium have independence movements, and may become concerned if
the prospect of Scottish independence is strengthened by the UK's departure from the EU.
But it is in the material interest of the EU, including Spain, to keep Scotland - with its contribution to the EU
budget and its extensive fisheries resources - inside the EU. Since Scotland's referendum in 2014 was part of a
constitutional process, Spain would have recognised Scottish independence if the vote had been 'yes', It would
not have facilitated Scotland's accession, but would have accepted it on the basis of a confirmation of the EU's
respect for the constitutional arrangements of its members. 
It is true that Spain, Slovakia, Romania, Greece, and Cyprus have refused to recognise Kosovo because its
unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia in 2008 could be a precedent for separatists in their own
countries. But it is also true that Spain and all other EU states immediately recognised Montenegro in 2006 when
its independence from Serbia resulted from a constitutional referendum. Madrid, which expects other states to
accept its interpretation of the Spanish constitution, will respect London's position concerning the
constitutionality of Scottish independence.
However, it is not sure that the Westminster parliament would agree to another independence referendum for
Scotland. The reason why it consented to the 2014 referendum was that the SNP, with a manifesto demanding a
referendum, had won a majority in Scottish elections. Although the SNP no longer has a majority in the Edinburgh
parliament, it could expect the Green Party to support a demand for independence. How would London respond?
The Conservative Party, mainly responsible for the departure of the UK from the EU, will not want to be responsible
for the break-up of the UK. With a majority in the House of Commons, it may refuse consent for another
referendum on the grounds that the 2014 referendum – a 'once-in-a-generation' vote – was decisive. That would
leave Scotland the option of declaring independence unilaterally, which would weaken its international position. 
If Scotland chooses independence, what procedure would be followed for it to remain in the EU? The use of Article
48 or Article 49 of the Treaty was much discussed in 2014, and now we have Article 50 in prospect. Since Article
50 will modify the geographical scope of the EU, it could take account of the Scottish case. It has been suggested
that Scotland could be designated as the UK's 'successor state', and thus inherit its EU membership, but this would
not be easy: London would not agree to Edinburgh inheriting other memberships such as the UN and NATO, and
the EU would not accept Scottish membership without an assessment of its compliance with the criteria for EU
membership. On these questions of procedure, the choice of Articles is an important matter for examination by
legal experts, but what will be decisive for Scotland's accession is the political will of Europe's leaders.
If and when a negotiation on Scotland's accession to the EU takes place, much will depend on whether the
Scottish government requests special terms. It would not be realistic to ask for the British 'opt-outs', which
anyhow are unnecessary – no country has ever been obliged to join the euro or Schengen unless it wished to do
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so. But Edinburgh has difficult questions to answer: for example, what currency would it use after independence –
the pound Sterling, or the Scottish pound? 
Scotland is not the only country of the UK whose situation is affected by the EU referendum:
• Wales voted to leave. The leader of Plaid Cymru, the nationalist party, said 'If Scotland's protection of its EU 
membership results in it choosing to leave the UK, people in Wales should be given the option of choosing the 
same at a referendum'.
• Northern Ireland voted to remain. Its First Minister, whose party campaigned to leave, welcomed the UK result;
the Deputy First Minister, whose party was for remain, said that Northern Ireland should not be taken out of the
EU against its will, and demanded a vote on the reunification of Ireland. The British government excludes such a
possibility. There is concern that the reintroduction of controls at the frontier with Ireland could disturb the 
peace process in Northern Ireland.
• England voted to leave. Of the four English regions, London was the only region that voted differently (60% 
Remain, 40% Leave) though some areas and cities (such as Oxford and Cambridge) also voted strongly to remain.
• Gibraltar, a dependent territory of the UK with 32,000 inhabitants, voted to stay (96% Remain, 4% Leave). Its 
leaders, and the British government, have rejected Spain's offer of joint sovereignty as a means to allow 
Gibraltar to stay in the EU.
Among these cases, the only one directly comparable to Scotland is Wales: it has a long-standing independence
movement, but much lower support for independence than Scotland.
PROSPECTS
Scotland's chances of remaining in the EU are good. At the time of the 2014 referendum, Scottish independence
was opposed by the British government, and other EU members did not wish to weaken the UK. As a result of the
EU referendum, in which it voted to remain, Scotland has gained friends among other Europeans, while the British
government has lost goodwill.
But the situation is complicated, and the sequence of future events is unclear. The Scottish government is cautious
in not committing itself to another independence referendum. Its priority is to keep Scotland in the EU: it argues
that all options should be on the table, and that independence is not its starting-point. These questions – whether
Scotland stays in the EU, and whether it becomes independent – are both closely linked to the process of British
withdrawal from the EU. But at present many aspects of that process remain unclear.
What position should the EU27 adopt? Scotland is a prosperous and stable democracy that has applied EU rules
and polices for more than 40 years. It is well qualified for EU membership. From the economic point of view, it is in
the EU's interest for it to remain: from the political point of view, to refuse Scotland after its vote to remain would
be a bad signal.
But at present it would be unwise for EU institutions or member states to take public positions for (or against)
Scottish independence: it is a tradition of the EU not to interfere in the constitutional affairs of member states. But
this does not exclude contacts with the Scottish government, which has embarked on a charm offensive with other
Europeans to underline its wish to remain in the EU. 
At some time, probably during the next two years, the Scottish government will have to decide whether or not 
to proceed to another independence referendum. In that situation, the EU should prepare to welcome Scotland 
as a member.
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